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ENHANCED RISK OF HARM TO ONE'S
SELF AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
EXCLUSION FROM ATHLETICS
By MATThEw J. MiTrEN*
This article discusses an athlete's legal right to participate in spon-
sored athletic competition' with a physical abnormality that exposes him
or her to an enhanced risk of injury or death. For purposes of this discus-
sion, I assume that the athlete has the necessary physical skills and abili-
ties to successfully play the sport with a physical impairment (e.g., a
cardiovascular or spinal abnormality or a missing or non-functioning
paired organ such as an eye or kidney) and that his or her participation
does not create an increased risk of physical injury to others. However,
the athlete may be exposed to a substantially enhanced risk of personal
injury by participating in a sport. A lack of available scientific data and
reliable clinical studies may cause sports medicine experts to disagree
regarding whether this increased risk of harm, created by the athlete's
physical abnormality, justifies medical disqualification from athletic
competition.
Considering the uncertainties present in sports medicine and the im-
possibility of accurately predicting whether a physically impaired athlete
will actually experience serious injury or death during sports participa-
tion as a result of his or her medical condition what is the appropriate
judicial construction of federal laws prohibiting medically unjustified dis-
crimination? Resolution of this issue requires proper delineation of the
respective bounds of an impaired athlete's liberty interest in having an
opportunity to participate in sports and a team's right (or that of a
sports league or sponsoring organization) to establish reasonable mini-
mum physical standards that must be satisfied by all participants. How
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law of Texas A&M University, Houston, TX.
B.A., 1981, The Ohio State University; J.D., 1984, University of Toledo College of Law. The
author filed an amicus brief on behalf of the American Medical Society For Sports Medicine
and the American Osteopathic Academy of Sports Medicine in support of Northwestern Uni-
versity in Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). I gratefully acknowledge
the insightful comments of Professors Bruce W. Burton and Gerald T. Wetherington, research
assistance of Twila L. Baker, and secretarial assistance of Helen Flores in connection with this
article.
1. The term "sponsored athletic competition" refers to organized team athletic events
from youth to professional league levels of competition as well as individual sports organized
and sponsored by various entities.
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we resolve this question implicates broader social values such as the lim-
its of libertarianism and acceptable communitarian protection of others'
health and safety, because sports is a microcosm of society in many
respects.
I begin by considering the legal nature of an amateur athlete's pro-
tected interest in participating in organized athletic competition and the
legal rights and duties arising out of sponsorship of amateur sports by a
team or other organization. Next I review and analyze the historical de-
velopment of case law concerning the federal rights of physically im-
paired amateur athletes to participate in their chosen sports under the
Rehabilitation Act of 19731 and propose a legal framework for resolving
participation disputes involving amateur athletes. I then discuss the im-
plications of this analysis for future claims under the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 19904 (hereinafter "ADA") by impaired professional
athletes who have been medically disqualified to play a sport because of
a physical impairment.
I. PARTIES' RESPECTIVE LEGAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTED INTERESTS
A. Athletes
Organized amateur athletic competition begins with youth sports
during elementary school years such as Little League baseball and gym-
nastics, includes interscholastic competition during high school, extends
to intercollegiate sports during college, and encompasses Olympic sports
during the teens through mid-life. Youth and high school sports are ex-
tracurricular activities engaged in by athletes who generally are minors.
Participants typically play these sports mainly for the social, educational,
and physical benefits of athletic competition, but some particularly tal-
ented high school athletes seek a college athletic scholarship. Most par-
ticipants in intercollegiate athletics are adults, and although they are
primarily considered to be students, playing a sport at the college varsity
level often is more than merely an extracurricular activity for the partici-
pating athletes. In some instances, a college athlete plays a sport to de-
velop the skills necessary for future participation at the professional or
Olympic levels of competition. Olympic athletes usually are adults
2. See generally D. STANLEY ErrznN & GEORGE H. SAGE, SOCIOLOGY OF NORTH AMBI -
CAN SPORT 43-55 (6th ed. 1997) (examining the reciprocal relationship between sports and
societal values); DREW A. HYLAND, PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 1-32 (1990) (recognizing that val-
ues in sports are, in part, a reflection of society's values).
3. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (1985).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (1995).
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(although some, such as most female gymnasts, are minors) with unique
talents providing them with the opportunity to participate in interna-
tional competition against other elite athletes.
Participation in amateur sports at any level of athletic competition
generally is considered to be a privilege rather than a legally protected
right. Although some courts hold that a high school student cannot be
arbitrarily denied an opportunity to participate in interscholastic sports
competition,5 that sports are an integral part of one's scholastic and so-
cial development,6 or that athletic competition is vital to obtaining a col-
lege education by means of an athletic scholarship,7 courts generally
refuse to recognize a constitutional right to play interscholastic sports.
8
Similarly, there is no constitutionally protected liberty or property inter-
est in playing intercollegiate athletics. 9 Although a college athletic schol-
arship is a contract between the student-athlete and his or her
university,' ° it does not guarantee either a position on the team or play-
ing time." 1 The national governing body for each Olympic sport has a
contractual relationship with its member athletes,' 2 and the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978 gives the organization the exclusive right to deter-
mine the membership of its national team for purposes of international
competition, so there is no legal right to participate in Olympic sports.'
Thus, the relationship between an amateur athlete and the sponsoring
educational institution or athletics organization is legally considered to
be consensual in nature.
B. Teams and Athletics-Event-Sponsoring Entities
An athlete may be medically disqualified by the team physician, or
event sponsor's medical personnel, if a physical abnormality exposes him
or her to a medically unreasonable risk of injury. A sponsoring educa-
tional institution or athletic organization may be reluctant to permit a
5. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Avant, 650 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
6. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Bryant, 313 So.2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
7. Boyd v. Board of Dirs. of McGahee Sch. Dist., 612 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
8. Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976); Tiffany v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n,
Inc., 726 P.2d 231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
9. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1981); Hawkins v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
10. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379-381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
11. Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987).
12. Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Or. 1994).
13. 36 U.S.C.A. 393 (5), (7) (1997); DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F.
Supp. 1181 (D.C. 1980) (athlete has no constitutional right to participate in Olympics).
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talented, but physically impaired athlete, to participate in a competitive
sport without medical clearance. The organization may also be con-
cerned about potential legal liability from allowing an impaired athlete
to participate. Apart from legal liability, the team or event sponsor also
may have a paternalistic desire to protect a physically impaired athlete's
health and safety by refusing to allow potential exposure to a risk of
serious harm during athletic competition. In addition, there may be con-
cern about potential psychological harm to others participating in the
game or event or the detrimental effects of adverse publicity on the
team or event sponsor's reputation if a physically impaired athlete suf-
fers serious injury or death.
Courts have held that both public educational institutions 14 and pri-
vate athletic governing bodies'" have a legitimate interest in protecting
an athlete from injury during athletic competition. Although these cases
involved federal or state constitutional challenges to mandatory drug
testing (rather than Rehabilitation Act or ADA claims), they recognize
that a team or athletic event sponsor has at least some inherent right to
protect an athlete's health and safety.' 6 Moreover, outside the context of
athletics, there are several judicially recognized social justifications for
preventing people from engaging in potentially dangerous activities and
harming themselves. For example, minimizing the public cost of injury
treatment and disability; 17 avoiding the loss of productive members of
society;' 8 and preventing the loss of economic support and/or consortium
to the injury victim's family19 are valid objectives.
Even if a team or sponsor of an athletic event has a general legal right
to protect the health and safety of participating athletes, the extent of its
14. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,662 (1995) (public high school has "impor-
tant" interest in screening for drugs that "pose substantial physical risks" to athlete himself or
herself). Accord Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding state law
requiring motorcyclists to wear protective headgear and rejecting plaintiff's claim that federal
Constitution "forbids enforcement of any statute aimed only at protecting a State's citizens
from the consequences of their own foolish behavior and not at protecting others.")
15. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 637 (Cal. 1994) (finding that private governing body for
intercollegiate athletics has valid interest in protecting health and safety of drug-ingesting
athletes).
16. Some courts, however, have questioned whether "governmental concern for the
health and safety of anyone who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself or herself to pos-
sible injury can ever be an acceptable area of intrusion on individual liberty. . ." Hoover v.
Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977).
17. Picou, 874 F.2d at 1522; Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277,279 (D. Mass. 1972); State
v. Laitinen, 459 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Wash. 1969).
18. Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Neb. 1992).
19. In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y. S.2d 996 (1985).
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legal duty to protect an athlete from a voluntarily assumed enhanced risk
of injury is uncertain. In Orr v. Brigham Young University,2" a federal
district court refused to impose a legal duty on a university to prevent an
adult athlete from continuing to play intercollegiate football to avoid
aggravating a pre-existing injury. The court rejected the player's conten-
tion that, by allowing him to participate, the university "assumed the
responsibility for his safety and deprived him of the normal opportunity
for self protection."'" Another court has suggested that a high school's
legal duty to protect a physically impaired athlete from voluntarily as-
sumed risks is limited to ensuring that the athlete (and parents if he or
she is a minor) is fully informed of an enhanced risk or severity of
threatened injury, in order to enable him or her to make a rational par-
ticipation decision.2'
Although the doctrines of express assumption of risk' or sovereign
immunity" may immunize a team or event sponsor from tort liability for
allowing a physically impaired athlete to participate, uncertainty con-
cerning legal liability is a legitimate interest to a team or sponsor of an
athletic event.
Although a sponsor of an amateur athletic event has both a legiti-
mate interest in protecting an impaired athlete's health and safety, and a
justifiable fear of legal liability if it does not do so, its interest in safe-
guarding other participants from psychological injury and protecting its
own reputation seem less compelling. Considered alone, possible harm
to team morale is not entitled to as significant weight when balanced
against the exercise of an athlete's federally protected civil liberties.-5
And, it may be difficult to establish that serious injury to, or even the
death of, a physically impaired athlete who voluntarily chooses to par-
ticipate in a sport, with full knowledge of an enhanced potential risk of
20. 960 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Utah 1994).
21. Id. at 1526. See generally Barbara J. Lorence, The University's Role Toward Student-
Athletes: A Moral or Legal Obligation?, 29 Duo. L. REv. 343, 355 (1991) (arguing against
"imposing a custodial duty on colleges and universities to protect 'adult' students, even those
with known health risks, who decide to participate in school-sponsored athletic events ..
22. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (D. N.J. 1980).
23. See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Liability of Sports Medicine Providers and Related
Entities, 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, Chap. 14A, §§ 14A.04[3] and
14A.05 [5] (G.A. Uberstine Ed. 1997).
24. Id. at §§ 14A.04[4] and 14A.05[6].
25. Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 946.
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harm, will significantly injure the reputation of the team or event
sponsor.26
II. REHABILITATION ACT CASES DEFINING AMATEUR ATHLETES'
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS
To prevail on a claim that exclusion from a sport or athletic event
violates the Rehabilitation Act, an athlete must prove: 1) he or she is
"disabled"; 2) he or she is "otherwise qualified" for the position or op-
portunity sought; 3) he or she has been excluded from the position solely
because of his or her disability; and 4) the position or opportunity exists
as part of a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.2 7 It
is not necessary that an entity's athletic program directly benefits from
federal funds. A public or private elementary or secondary educational
institution, as well as any other sponsor of an athletic event, is covered
by the Rehabilitation Act if any aspect of it receives any form of federal
funding.2"
A physically impaired athlete also could assert that his or her exclu-
sion from a sport violates the ADA, although cases challenging such ex-
clusion, because of increased risk of injury to one's self, thus far have
only been brought under the Rehabilitation Act. Such a claim requires
proof of essentially the same elements as a Rehabilitation Act claim2 9
except that, instead of showing that the defendant receives federal funds,
the athlete must prove that the defendant is covered by the ADA's
"public entity" 3° or "public accommodation"'" provisions. A sponsor of
an amateur athletic event that is not covered by the Rehabilitation Act
because it does not receive federal funds may nevertheless be covered
under the ADA's public entity or public accommodation sections.32 Un-
26. Pahulu v. Univ. of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D. Kan. 1995) (university athletics
director acknowledged that university will suffer no foreseeable harm to its reputation if phys-
ically impaired player is allowed to continue playing football); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520
F. Supp. 789,794 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("Columbia [University] has never asserted that it would be
harmed by plaintiff's intercollegiate football career. .. ").
27. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. Matthev J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes With Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities: Who
Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. Rv. 987, 1008-09 (1992). Public educational
institutions are not immune from suit under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. See Mayer v.
Univ. of Minnesota, 940 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Minn. 1996).
29. See generally, Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in
Interscholastic Sports, 49 ALA. L. REv. ( forthcoming 1998).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131 & 12132 (1995).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(L) (1995).
32. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992)
("'public accommodation' includes Little League Baseball and its games").
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less otherwise noted, I will consider both laws together in addressing a
physically impaired amateur athlete's legal right to participate in
sports.33
A person with a physical impairment which substantially limits one
or more of his or her major life activities, or has a record of such impair-
ment, or is regarded as having such an impairment, is considered to be
"disabled" and covered by the Act. 4 The first Rehabilitation Act suits
were brought by high school or college athletes with either a missing or
non-functioning eye or kidney who had been excluded from participat-
ing in a contact sport. Courts either assumed that these athletes satisfied
the Act's definition of an individual with a "disability," or found this
requirement satisfied without engaging in extensive analysis.
In resolving these initial cases, courts focused on the requirement
that an athlete be "otherwise qualified" to participate in a sport despite a
physical abnormality. In a 1977 case, Kampmeier v. Nyquist,36 the Sec-
ond Circuit ruled that a high school's refusal to permit one-eyed athletes
to play contact sports complied with the Act despite conflicting physician
participation recommendations. Although the plaintiffs had the requisite
ability and skill to play basketball, and their medical condition did not
expose others to an enhanced risk of injury, they were not allowed to
participate because of an enhanced risk of injury to themselves.
Neither the Act nor its implementing regulations regarding inter-
scholastic or intercollegiate sports directly address whether an enhanced
risk or severity of injury to an athlete is a legally valid justification for
exclusion from school-sponsored athletics.37 Without citing any judicial
precedent, the Kampmeier court held that a "substantial justification" is
required to exclude an impaired athlete from participation in a sport .3
The court found that the team physician's medical recommendation,
against participation, which was consistent with then current American
Medical Association guidelines, because plaintiffs would be subjected to
a perceived "high risk" of injury during athletic competition, provided a
"substantial justification" for the school's decision. 9 Other examining
33. The ADA is patterned after the Rehabilitation Act, and courts generally rely on cases
construing similar provisions of the Rehabilitation Act in interpreting the ADA. See generally
Milani, supra note 29.
34. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (1985).
35. See, e.g., Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 791 (parties do not dispute that football player with
sight in only one eye is handicapped individual covered by the Act).
36. 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 104.37(c) and 104.47(a) (1997); 45 C.F.R. § 84.37(c) and 84.47(a) (1997).
38. 553 F.2d at 299.
39. Id.
1998]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
physicians medically cleared the plaintiffs to play interscholastic basket-
ball, based on their belief that special goggles would adequately protect
the plaintiffs' eyes from injury during competition. Observing that the
team physician had nevertheless concluded that participation in contact
sports with protective gear would still present an unreasonable risk of
eye injury, the court found "little evidence - medical, statistical, or
otherwise - which would cast doubt on the substantiality of this
rationale."40
Finding that public high schools have "a parens patriae interest in
protecting the well-being of their students,"'" the court held that the
plaintiffs are not "otherwise qualified" to play interscholastic basketball.
Despite recognizing the important role of athletics in the life and growth
of children, and that the plaintiffs were being deprived of an opportunity
to play their chosen sports, the court observed that they still had the
option of participating in noncontact sports.42
In a 1979 case not involving athletics, Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis4 3 the Supreme Court held that, under the Act, an educa-
tional institution may require a person to possess "reasonable physical
qualifications" necessary to protect others' safety as a condition of partici-
pating in its programs and activities. Although "mere possession of a
handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to func-
tion," the Court ruled that a school need "not lower or substantially
modify its standards to accommodate a handicapped person. '44 The
Court concluded that an individual is "otherwise qualified" if "able to
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap,"'45 but did
not determine whether risk of harm to one's self is a valid reason to
exclude him or her from an activity.
In Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,46 a federal district
court held that a high school's refusal to permit a student to wrestle with
only one kidney violated the Act because other "respectable medical au-
thority" cleared him to participate. Without citing or discussing
Kampmeier, the court rejected the school's argument that the student
was not "otherwise qualified" because he was unable to obtain medical
clearance from the team physician with only one kidney. Relying on Da-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 300.
42. Id.
43. 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979).
44. Id. at 405 and 413.
45. Id. at 406, 407, n.7 (emphasis added).
46. 490 F. Supp. 948, 953 (D. N.J. 1980).
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vis, the court found that the student was "otherwise qualified" because,
with the exception of his failure to pass the team physician's examina-
tion, he satisfied all of the wrestling program's requirements and did not
pose a risk of increased injury to others "in spite of the fact he was born
with one kidney."4
The Poole court did not directly address whether requiring an athlete
to pass the team physician's medical examination, to protect his or her
own safety, is a permissible "reasonable physical qualification" under
Davis. Poole also did not consider whether an athlete's failure to satisfy
this school-established requirement was a legally valid "substantial justi-
fication" for exclusion under Kampmeier. Instead, Poole relied on a
1978 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare policy interpreta-
tion of the Act's regulations prohibiting schools from categorically ex-
cluding athletes who have a missing or non-functioning organ from
playing contact sports.48
The Poole court found that the Act's purpose is "to permit handi-
capped individuals to live life as fully as they are able, without paternal-
istic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for them, 49
thereby according great weight to an impaired athlete's interest in indi-
vidual autonomy. The court held that the school's interest in protecting a
student's physical health did not justify excluding him from contact
sports and was not a proper exercise of its in loco parentis authority
when his parents supported his decision to participate in wrestling.50 The
court also suggested that, because the school had alerted plaintiff and his
parents of the potential health risks of playing with his physical abnor-
mality, it would not be legally liable for any injuries he suffered as a
result of wrestling in his condition.5
Similarly, in Wright v. Columbia University,5" another federal district
court held that the Act required a university to permit an outstanding
athlete with sight in only one eye to play football. Distinguishing
Kampmeier by accepting the testimony of the plaintiff's ophthalmologist
that, "no substantial risk of serious eye injury related to football ex-
ists[,]" the court rejected the school's reliance on the team physician's
47. Id. at 953.
48. Id. at 954. See generally Mitten, supra note 28, at 1016-17 (discussing HEW policy
interpretation).
49. 490 F. Supp. at 953-54.
50. Id. at 952-53.
51. Id. at 954.
52. 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
1998]
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contrary medical opinion.53 The plaintiff testified that "he seriously con-
sidered and appreciates the risks incident to playing football with im-
paired vision and willingly accepts them."54
The court found that he was "otherwise qualified" to play, and the
university was not forced to "lower or... effect substantial modifications
of its standards,"55 which would be a valid defense to his exclusion under
Davis. Following Poole, the court found that the plaintiff "is indeed an
intelligent, motivated young man who is capable of making this decision
which affects his health and well-being."56 Holding that the Act "prohib-
its 'paternalistic authorities' from deciding that certain activities are 'too
risky' for a handicapped person,"57 the court noted that excluding the
plaintiff would deprive him of an opportunity to participate fully in an
intercollegiate football program that also may preclude him from a fu-
ture professional football career.58
In Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District,59 a federal district court
held that a high school's decision to exclude an excellent player with one
kidney from its football team in accordance with its team physician's rec-
ommendation violated the Act. While adopting Kampmeier's "substan-
tial justification" standard, the court found it was not satisfied based on
the evidence of record. The court framed the key issue as whether the
risk of injury to the plaintiff "is significant enough to make this concern
any justification" for the school's action.60 Because the plaintiff's per-
sonal physician concluded that "there is no medical reason why [he] can-
not play football" with appropriate protective padding, and, most
importantly, the opinion of other physicians recommending against his
participation "lacks a medical basis," the court found no "substantial jus-
tification" for preventing the plaintiff from playing football.6'
The school was concerned about potential legal liability if the plain-
tiff lost his one functioning kidney while playing football. According to
the court, this also was not a "substantial justification" for excluding him
from the sport, because he and his parents were willing to release the
school from liability if he injured his kidney, while playing football. 62
53. Id. at 793-94.
54. Id. at 793.
55. Id. (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979)).
56. Id. at 794.
57. 520 F. Supp. at 794 (citing Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 954).
58. Id. at 793.
59. 550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
60. Id. at 424.
61. Id. at 423-24.
62. Id. at 424.
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Concluding that the "plaintiff is being deprived of an important right
guaranteed by federal legislation," the court noted that he is a "col-
legiate caliber football player" who might earn a college athletic scholar-
ship if allowed to continue playing high school football.63
After Poole, Wright, and Grube were decided, in Alexander v.
Choate,64 the United States Supreme Court clarified Davis by holding
that an entity covered by the Rehabilitation Act "need not be required
to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommodate
the handicapped, [but] it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones."
This case did not involve the application of the Act to athletics, but sug-
gests that physically impaired athletes are legally entitled to reasonable
accommodations necessary to enable them to compete in a sport with
their medical condition.
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided another important
case under the Act by considering when it is legally permissible to ex-
clude a physically impaired person from an activity or program to pre-
vent a risk of harm to others. In School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v
Arline,65 the Court held that the Act does not prohibit disparate treat-
ment of the handicapped necessary to avoid "exposing others to signifi-
cant health and safety risks." The Court explained that "in determining
whether an individual is 'otherwise qualified,' she or he is entitled to an
opportunity to have [one's] condition evaluated in light of medical evi-
dence. '6 6 The decision to exclude an individual from a particular pro-
gram or activity must be based on "reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge."67 The nature, duration, probability, and
severity of harm likely to result from the handicapped individual's par-
ticipation, and whether it can be effectively reduced by reasonable ac-
commodation, are factors to be considered.68
After Arline, a minor athlete asserted an absolute right to play high
school football under the Act, despite unanimous agreement by examin-
ing physicians that he should not play with a serious heart condition that
could be fatal. In Larkin v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,69 in an unreported
63. Id. 424-25.
64. 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
65. 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
66. 1& at 285.
67. 1& at 288 (citation omitted).
68. I1.
69. Partial Transcript of Proceedings, No. C-1-90-619 (S.D. Ohio, fied Aug. 31, 1990)
(oral findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting denial of injunctive relief and dismissal
of complaint) at 15-16 [hereinafter "Partial Transcript"]. See generally Mitten, supra note 28,
at 1014-16 for a more thorough discussion of this case.
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oral opinion issued from the bench, Judge Herman J. Weber held that,
although the plaintiff was "handicapped," the school's acceptance of
unanimous physician recommendations that he not continue playing
football, did not violate the Act. The court ruled that the plaintiff's in-
ability to satisfy an Ohio High School Athletics Association by-law re-
quiring "a physician certification" of medical fitness as a condition of
participation in interscholastic athletics was a "substantial justification"
for the school's decision to exclude him.7 ° The court also recognized
that, under Ohio law, the plaintiff's parents could not validly waive their
minor son's potential legal claims if he were injured while playing foot-
ball.7' Without citing Arline or Kampmeier, Larkin implicitly relies on
their holdings in concluding that exclusion of an athlete from a sport,
based on a reasonable medical judgment that athletic participation
would expose him or her to an enhanced risk of serious injury or death,
does not violate the Act.
Recent Rehabilitation Act cases brought by athletes challenging their
medical disqualification from a sport, specifically consider whether an
athlete is "disabled" under the statute, as well as whether he or she is
"otherwise qualified" to participate. In Pahulu v. University of Kansas,72
the court upheld a public university's decision not to allow Alani Pahulu
to continue playing college football after being medically disqualified by
the team physician. After experiencing transient quadriplegia while
making a tackle during a scrimmage, he was found to have an abnor-
mally narrow cervical canal. After consulting with a neurosurgeon, the
team physician concluded that he was at extremely high risk for sus-
taining permanent, severe neurological injury, including permanent
quadriplegia, if he resumed playing college football. The university
agreed to honor his athletic scholarship, although he was not permitted
to play football. Nevertheless, he wanted to continue playing because
three other medical specialists concluded that his spinal abnormality did
not expose him to a greater risk of permanent paralysis than any other
player.
The court first considered the Act's requirement that the plaintiff
have a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of his
major life activities. It found that his congenitally narrow cervical canal
is a physical impairment, and applying a subjective standard, that inter-
collegiate football is a part of the student's major life activity of learn-
70. Partial Transcript at 16.
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995).
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ing.73 However, the court held that he is not "disabled" under the Act
because his exclusion from football does not substantially limit his op-
portunity to learn since he retained his athletic scholarship, which pro-
vided him with continued access to all academic services, and he was
allowed to participate in the university's football program in a role other
than as a player.74
Without citing any of the foregoing cases, the court also held that the
student is not "otherwise qualified" because he was not able to satisfy all
of the football program's requirements in spite of his disability, namely,
medical clearance from the university's team physician to play football.
The court found that the team physician's "conservative" medical opin-
ion is "reasonable and rational" and "supported by substantial compe-
tent evidence" for which it is "unwilling to substitute its judgment. 75
In Knapp v. Northwestern University,76 the Seventh Circuit reversed
the lower court's holding that Northwestern University violated the Re-
habilitation Act in following its team physician's medical recommenda-
tion that an athlete with a heart condition known as idiopathic
ventricular fibrillation not play intercollegiate basketball. As a high
school senior, Nicholas Knapp suffered sudden cardiac arrest while play-
ing recreational basketball, which required cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion and defibrillation to restart his heart. Thereafter, he had an internal
cardioverter-defibrillator implanted in his abdomen. He subsequently
played competitive recreational basketball without any incidents of car-
diac arrest for two years and received medical clearance to play college
basketball from three cardiologists who examined him.
Northwestern agreed to honor its commitment to provide Knapp
with an athletic scholarship, although it adhered to its team physician's
medical disqualification from intercollegiate basketball. This recommen-
dation was based on Knapp's medical records and history, the 26th
Bethesda Conference guidelines for athletic participation with cardio-
vascular abnormalities, 77 and opinions from two consulting cardiologists
who concluded that Knapp would expose himself to a significant risk of
ventricular fibrillation or cardiac arrest during competitive athletics.
73. Id. at 1390-93.
74. Id. at 1393.
75. Id. at 1394.
76. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 U.S. 2454 (1997).
77. 26' Bethesda Conference Recommendations for Determining Eligibility for Competi-
tion of Athletes With Cardiovascular Abnormalities, 24 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF CARDIOLOGY 845-899 (1984).
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All medical experts agreed on the following facts: Knapp had suf-
fered sudden cardiac death due to ventricular fibrillation; even with the
internal defibrillator; playing college basketball placed Knapp at a
higher risk for suffering another event of sudden cardiac death compared
to other male college basketball players; the internal defibrillator has
never been tested under the conditions of intercollegiate basketball; and
no person currently plays or has ever played college or professional bas-
ketball after suffering sudden cardiac death and having a defibrillator
implanted.78
The lower court held that Knapp is "disabled" under the Act. The
parties did not dispute that Knapp is perceived as having a permanent
cardiovascular impairment, which is a physical impairment under the
statute. The court found that intercollegiate basketball is a major life
activity for Knapp, because it "is an important and integral part of [his]
education and learning experience. ' 79 Because practicing with the team
and competing in games is necessary for learning discipline, teamwork,
and perseverance, the trial court concluded that Northwestern's refusal
to allow Knapp to play substantially limits his ability to play college
basketball.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court's conclusion and
held that Knapp is not "disabled" under the Act. The appellate court
held that "[p]laying intercollegiate basketball obviously is not in and of
itself a major life activity."80 Finding that learning is the affected major
life activity, the court concluded that playing intercollegiate basketball is
"only one part of the education available to Knapp at Northwestern."'"
Consistent with Pahulu, the court observed that Knapp's "inability to
play intercollegiate basketball at Northwestern forecloses only a small
portion of his collegiate [learning] opportunities"' and does not sub-
stantially limit his college education because his athletic scholarship con-
tinues, thereby allowing him full access to all of the university's other
programs and activities.
The parties agreed that Knapp is not "otherwise qualified" under the
Act if there is a "genuine substantial risk" that he could be seriously
injured while playing basketball at Northwestern.83 The lower court
noted that all medical experts agreed on the underlying basic scientific
78. Id. at 477-78.
79. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
80. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480.
81. Id. at 481.
82. Id. at 482.
83. 942 F. Supp. at 1196.
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and medical principles, but that, because no one had ever played college
basketball with an implanted defibrillator, the risk that Knapp would
suffer another incident of cardiac arrest while playing could not be ob-
jectively quantified8 4 Medical experts disagreed whether the risk of in-
jury to Knapp was substantial enough to medically justify his exclusion
from intercollegiate basketball.
The lower court conceded that excluding Knapp from an" 'unessen-
tial' activity," such as intercollegiate basketball, that creates an increased
uncertain risk of serious personal injury "is clearly rational in the medi-
cal profession," given the absence of proven safety.85 However, the court
concluded that the Act "require[s] a judicial decision on the substantial-
ity of the risk" necessitating consideration of "the testimony of all the
experts who testified and determin[ing] which are most persuasive." 6
After weighing the experts' testimony, the court found that the risk of
injury to Knapp while playing college basketball is not medically sub-
stantial and that the implanted defibrillator most likely would restore his
heart beat to normal if Knapp's heart rate became abnormal during
strenuous physical exertion.87
The Seventh Circuit again disagreed with the lower court and con-
cluded that Knapp is not "otherwise qualified" to play basketball at
Northwestern under the Act. Citing Davis, the appellate court held that
a university legally may establish legitimate physical qualifications that
an individual must satisfy in order to participate in its athletic program. 8
Agreeing with the lower court and the parties that a "significant risk of
personal physical injury" that cannot be eliminated justifies medical dis-
qualification from an activity, the court framed the controlling issue as,
"[W]ho should make such an assessment[?]"8 9
Holding that Knapp's exclusion from Northwestern's basketball team
was legally justified, the Seventh Circuit explained:
We disagree with the district court's legal determination that
such decisions are to be made by the courts and believe instead
that medical determinations of this sort are best left to team doc-
tors and universities as long as they are made with reason and
rationality and with full regard to possible and reasonable accom-
modations. In cases such as ours, where Northwestern has ex-
84. Id. at 1196.
85. Id. at 1197.
86. Id. at 1196-97.
87. Id. at 1197-98.
88. 101 F.3d at 482.
89. Id. at 483.
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amined both Knapp and his medical records, and considered his
medical history and the relation between his prior sudden cardiac
death and the possibility of future occurrences, has considered the
severity of the potential injury, and has rationally and reasonably
reviewed consensus medical opinions or recommendations in the
pertinent field -regardless whether conflicting medical opinions
exist - the university has the right to determine that an individual
is not otherwise medically qualified to play without violating the
Rehabilitation Act. The place of the court in such cases is to make
sure that the decision-maker has reasonably considered and relied
upon sufficient evidence specific to the individual and the poten-
tial injury, not to determine on its own which evidence it believes
is more persuasive.
We do not believe that, in cases where medical experts disa-
gree in their assessment of the extent of a real risk of serious
harm or death, Congress intended that the courts - neutral arbi-
ters but generally less skilled in medicine than the experts in-
volved - should make the final medical decision. Instead, in the
midst of conflicting expert testimony regarding the degree of seri-
ous risk of harm or death, the court's place is to ensure that the
exclusion or disqualification of an individual was individualized,
reasonably made, and based upon competent medical evidence.
So long as these factors exist, it will be the rare case regarding
participation in athletics where a court may substitute its judg-
ment for that of the school's team physicians.
In closing, we wish to make clear that we are not saying
Northwestern's decision necessarily is the right decision. We say
only that it is not an illegal one under the Rehabilitation Act. On
the same facts, another team physician at another university, re-
viewing the same medical history, physical evaluation, and medi-
cal recommendations, might reasonably decide that Knapp met
the physical qualifications for playing on an intercollegiate bas-
ketball team. Simply put, all universities need not evaluate risk
the same way. What we say in this case is that if substantial evi-
dence supports the decision-maker - here Northwestern - that
decision must be respected.90
90. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis in original).
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III. SYNTHESIS AND CRITIQUE OF REHABILITATION ACT PRECEDENT
Federal trial and appellate courts, thus far, have resolved claims
brought by physically impaired amateur athletes on a case-by-case basis,
without clear direction from Congress or explicit guidance from the
Supreme Court. Neither the Rehabilitation Act nor its accompanying
regulations specifically address whether exclusion of a skilled athlete,
with a physical abnormality from a desired sport substantially limits a
"major life activity." 91 Moreover, the Act is silent regarding whether a
risk of physical harm solely to one's self precludes an athlete from being
"otherwise qualified," and the Supreme Court has not yet considered
this issue.
In construing the Act's requirements that an athlete be both "dis-
abled" and "otherwise qualified" to participate, it appears that courts
are implicitly balancing the athlete's interest in playing a sport with the
sponsoring institution's interest in protecting the health and safety of
participants. The foregoing cases illustrate that courts recognize that ath-
letic competition is a valued component of both high school and college
education, but are divided regarding the importance of athletics in a stu-
dent's learning experience. On the other hand, the judiciary considers
the protection of an athlete's health to be a legitimate objective, regard-
less of whether an educational institution has an affirmative legal duty
to prevent a student from harming one's self, but does not always con-
sider this interest to be paramount. Courts usually struggle to weigh
appropriately the parties' conflicting interests particularly when medical
experts are divided in their participation recommendations.
A. Exclusion From Amateur Athletics as Substantially Limiting a
Major Life Activity
In determining whether an individual athlete's exclusion from athlet-
ics substantially limits a major life activity, courts should accord greater
weight to the importance of athletic competition in high school and col-
lege education. Although most students do not participate in intercolle-
giate or interscholastic sports, it is appropriate to apply a subjective test
in resolving this issue because the Act references "such person's major
life activities,"9" thereby indicating the necessary individualized nature
of this inquiry. Consistent with this language, some courts have held that
athletics are sufficiently intertwined with education, such that they con-
91. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (1985); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997).
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (1985) (emphasis added).
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stitute a major life activity for particular individuals playing interscholas-
tic or intercollegiate sports.93
At the high school level, interscholastic athletics play an integral role
in enabling participants to earn better grades and develop social skills by
teaching discipline, teamwork, commitment, motivation, and hard
work.94 The vast majority of people do not participate in structured
competitive athletics beyond high school, and their last opportunity to
take advantage of these important educational benefits occurs during
this formative four-year period.
Intercollegiate athletics play a different role in the educational pro-
cess for the relatively small number of college students participating in
them, but they are an important part of a university's primary mission of
helping an individual maximize one's learning and career potential -
whether it be academic, physical, or artistic prowess or a combination of
these talents. Moreover, in other contexts, courts have recognized that
intercollegiate athletics are an integral component of American higher
education and provide invaluable lessons that help further general life
success and careers outside of professional sports.95
Whether exclusion from intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics
substantially limits one's opportunity to learn must necessarily be con-
sidered on an individualized basis.96 Even if there are other educational
benefits available to excluded physically impaired athletes, they are be-
ing denied an equal opportunity to participate fully in all of an educa-
tional institution's programs and activities which are generally available
to all persons with the requisite skills and abilities.97 If physically im-
paired high school and college athletes are not covered by the Act, such
93. Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1391; Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F.
Supp. 483, 488-89 (E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). See
generally Milani, supra note 29.
94. 863 F. Supp.at 488-89. See generally Milani, supra note 29.
95. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993); Kondos v. West Virginia Bd.
of Regents, 318 F. Supp. 394, 396 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), affd, 441 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1971);
Harris v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 558 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997);
Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
96. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 481.
97. Milani, supra note 29. In challenging exclusion from amateur athletic sports or events
outside of interscholastic or intercollegiate sports, a physically impaired athlete must demon-
strate that such exclusion substantially limits a major life activity. The same arguments dis-
cussed above can be made regarding the educational benefits of participation in youth sports,
although they are somewhat more attenuated outside the context of school-sponsored sports.
There is, however, a stronger argument that excluding an elite athlete who has trained for
many years for an Olympic sport substantially limits what is for him or her a major life
activity.
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an athlete is deprived of his or her federal right to have one's medical
condition individually evaluated as well as the full potential educational
benefits of competitive athletics if he or she is found to be "otherwise
qualified" under the Act. Accordingly, it would further the Act's objec-
tives of prohibiting medically unjustified discrimination against physi-
cally impaired persons by ensuring that these athletes are protected by
the Act.
B. "Otherwise Qualified" to Participate in Amateur Athletics
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,9s the United
States Supreme Court ruled that handicapped persons are not a suspect
or quasi-suspect class justifying heightened scrutiny of alleged discrimi-
nation. Under Cleburne, to successfully defend a denial of equal protec-
tion of the law claim, a public school can justify the exclusion of a
physically impaired athlete from a sport if its decision is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate objective such as protecting his or her health and
safety. However, unlike the federal Constitution, the Rehabilitation Act
requires that a covered educational institution or entity have more than
merely a rational basis for discriminating against a physically impaired
athlete.9 9 Courts have struggled to formulate the appropriate legal stan-
dard justifying exclusion of a physically impaired athlete from a sport for
medial reasons.
The Larkin court properly rejected the contention that the Act cre-
ates an absolute right for a physically impaired amateur athlete to par-
ticipate in a sport, even if there is universal agreement among physicians
that his or her medical condition creates a significant risk of serious per-
sonal injury or death.' 0 Absent clear legislative intent supporting such a
position, it is extremely unlikely that Congress intended the Rehabilita-
tion Act to be a means of forcing covered entities to enable amateur
athletes to take potentially life-threatening risks in a sport that is merely
an avocation. To the contrary, in Davis, the Supreme Court held that the
Act does not prohibit an educational institution from requiring that its
students possess "reasonable physical qualifications" in order to partici-
pate in its programs and activities. 101
98. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
99. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th
Cir. 1981); Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1991).
100. See generally notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
101. Davis, 442 U.S. at 414.
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In construing the Act's "otherwise qualified" requirement, as applied
to athletics, some courts hold that an athlete with a physical abnormality
may be excluded from a sport only if there is a "substantial justification"
for doing so. 10 2 Even if this specific terminology is not used, or the ap-
propriate legal standard is phrased somewhat differently, courts gener-
ally agree that the Act permits an athlete to be medically disqualified, if
necessary to prevent a significant risk of serious personal injury such as a
permanently crippling injury or death. 3  Courts have adopted a similar
judicial standard regarding the legally permissible exclusion of handi-
capped persons from covered employment opportunities under the
Act.
1 0 4
Judicial formulation and acceptance of the "significant risk of serious
injury" standard as a legal justification for excluding a physically im-
paired athlete from a sport does not, however, resolve the key issue in
determining whether an athlete is "otherwise qualified" to participate.
As the Knapp appellate court recognized, this issue is, "Who should
make such an assessment" 05 when there is no definitive scientific evi-
dence and medical experts conflict in their athletic participation recom-
mendations? There are three theoretical models of decision-making that
have been adopted by courts in construing the Act as it governs athletes
which I will term as: 1) the judicial/medical fact-finding model; 2) the
athlete informed consent model; and 3) the team physician medical judg-
ment model.
102. Kampmeier, 553 F.2d at 299; Grube, 550 F. Supp. at 423; Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793;
Partial Transcript, No. C-1-90-619, at 16.
103. See generally notes 36-90 and accompanying text. Some legal scholars also have ad-
vocated that this is the proper standard to apply under the Rehabilitation Act. Cathy J. Jones,
College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 113, 206
& 212 (1992); Steven K. Derian, Of Hank Gathers and Mark Seay: Who Decides Which Risks
an Athlete Is Allowed to Undertake?, 5 UCLA J. ED. 1, 15 (Summer 1991). One commentator
asserts that, because Congress recognized a threatened harm to others' defense in the ADA's
employment provisions [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(3) (1995) and 12113 (1995)] without expressly
establishing a threatened harm to self defense, a physically impaired amateur athlete has an
absolute right to participate in athletics even if doing so would expose him or her to a signifi-
cant risk of serious injury. Milani, supra note 29. Another commentator argues that the ADA
should be construed consistently with the Rehabilitation Act to allow a covered entity to le-
gally exclude an amateur athlete from a sport to prevent exposure to a significant risk of
substantial harm to one's self. Jones, at 206-07 & 212.
104. The Rehabilitation Act's regulations relating to employment provide that a handi-
capped person is not "qualified" to perform the essential functions of a position if he or she
cannot do so without endangering their own health and safety. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1997).
Mitten, supra note 28 at 1019 (collecting cases holding that exclusion from employment to
prevent significant risk of substantial harm to one's self is legally valid).
105. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
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1. Overview of Three Decision-Making Models
Under the judicial/medical fact-finding model, which was used by the
Knapp trial court, a court resolves conflicting medical testimony regard-
ing whether a disabled athlete's condition creates a significant risk of
substantial injury while playing a sport. The Knapp trial court judge con-
cluded: "Congress has required a judicial decision on the substantiality
of the risk" and "I must consider the testimony of all the experts who
testified and determine which are most persuasive."1"6 This model re-
quires a court to determine whether there is a valid basis for medically
disqualifying an athlete from participation as a matter of fact.
The athlete informed consent model permits the athlete (and his or
her parents or guardian if he or she is a minor) to decide whether to
participate if respectable medical authority provides clearance to play
the sport. Under this model, the athlete is allowed to participate even if
he or she has been medically disqualified by the team physician if willing
to waive any potential legal claims against the educational institution or
sports event sponsor for injury that occurs while playing with his or her
physical impairment. °7 As the Poole court explained:
Life has risks. The purpose of [the Act], however, is to permit
handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are able, with-
out paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too
risky for them. . . The [school's] responsibility is to see that he
does not pursue this course in a foolish manner. They therefore
have a duty to alert Richard and his parents to the dangers in-
volved and to require them to deal with the matter rationally. 08
Poole suggests that an athlete must obtain medical clearance from his or
her chosen physician in order to have an autonomy right to participate in
sports under the Act.
Under the team physician model, a school has a valid legal justifica-
tion, as a matter of law, for excluding an athlete who has been medically
disqualified by the team physician. The school is entitled to rely on its
team physician's reasonable opinion that the athlete's disability exposes
him or her to a significant risk of substantial injury during athletic com-
106. 942 F. Supp. at 1196-97.
107. See Poole, 490 F.Supp. 948; Wright, 520 F.Supp. 789; and Grube, 550 F.Supp.418;
discussed in notes 46-63 and accompanying text
108. Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953-54.
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petition, even if other physicians have provided medical clearance. 10 9 In
Knapp, the Seventh Circuit held:
[M]edical determinations of this sort are best left to team doc-
tors and universities as long as they are made with reason and
rationally and with full regard to possible and reasonable accom-
modations... The place of the court in such cases is to make sure
that the decision-maker has reasonably considered and relied
upon sufficient evidence specific to the individual and potential
injury, not to determine on its own which evidence it believes is
more persuasive." 0
Each of these three models has its respective pluses and minuses. The
litmus test, however, is which model best furthers Congressional intent
in formulating the Rehabilitation Act, accords with Supreme Court pre-
cedent construing the Act, and furthers public policy? For the following
reasons, I believe the team physician model accomplishes these objec-
tives better than the other two models.
2. Judicial/Medical Fact-finding Model
The judicial/medical fact-finding model is consistent with some other
cases construing the Act outside of the athletics context. These cases
hold that the trial court must make a de novo assessment of the risk of
personal injury to a disabled person."' This model enables the court to
disregard a reasonably conservative medical opinion disqualifying a dis-
abled athlete to protect his or her health in favor of a more liberal medi-
cal opinion that would permit participation, contrary to the school's
legitimate safety interests. In determining whether there is a significant
risk of substantial harm to a disabled athlete as a matter of fact, a court
would not be bound by the team physician's medical opinion.
This model, however, conflicts with Supreme Court precedent under
the Act. Davis holds that an educational institution legally may require
that its students possess "reasonable physical qualifications" in order to
participate in its programs and activities." 2 It also contravenes the Ar-
line holding that physically impaired persons may be legally excluded
109. See Knapp, 942 F.Supp. 1191 (and text and discussion in notes 83-90); Kampmeier,
553 F.Supp.296 (and text and discussion in notes 36-42); and Pahulu, 897 F.Supp. 1387 (and
text and discussion in note 75).
110. 101 F.3d at 484.
111. See, e.g., Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 25 F.3d 667,669 (8th Cir. 1994); Chiari v. City of
League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir.
1985); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 779 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents of the
Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981).
112. 442 U.S. at 414.
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from activities "based on reasoned and medically sound judgments.""1 3
According to the Court, the purpose of the Act is to protect a physically
impaired person "from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear" and to provide an opportunity to have one's condition
individually evaluated in light of medical evidence.""' 4 The Act should
not be construed to require courts to exhaust scarce judicial resources
attempting to resolve an issue of medical uncertainty on which there is
no consensus among medical experts."x5
If Congress had actually intended to limit a school's legal ability to
exclude an athlete from a sport, consistent with its team physician's med-
ical judgment, it could have established an explicit statutory framework
for this purpose. For example, a New York education law statute ex-
pressly provides a judicial procedure for enabling a physically impaired
athlete to participate in interscholastic athletics despite an inability to
obtain medical clearance from the school physician." 6 A petition seek-
ing court-ordered participation must be accompanied by affidavits from
two physicians testifying that the athlete's participation would be "rea-
sonably safe. 1" 7 The court will order the school to permit participation
if it finds that participation in a sport would be in the athlete's best inter-
ests and reasonably safe."" The statute immunizes a school district from
liability for injury sustained by a physically impaired student while par-
ticipating in athletics pursuant to a court order. 19
The New York statute effectively requires a court to resolve conflict-
ing medical opinions, as a matter of fact, in determining whether athletic
participation would be reasonably safe. This is consistent with the state
legislature's intent as reflected in the express language of the statute. In
accordance with this explicit statutory authorization, a New York appel-
late court affirmed the lower court's order allowing an athlete to partici-
113. 480 U.S. at 285.
114. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 289.
115. "Judges are not trained scientists. They inevitably lack the scientific training that
might facilitate the evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who
make such claims. They typically are generalists, dealing with cases that may vary widely in
respect to substantive subject matter. Their primary objective is usually process-related: That
of seeing that a decision is reached fairly and in a timely way." STEVEN G. BREYER, THE
INTERDEPENDENCE OF SCIENCE AND LAW, Address at Annual Meeting of The American
Ass'n for the Advancement of Science. Philadelphia, PA, Feb. 16, 1998, at 6.
116. N.Y. Education Law § 3208-a (McKinney Supp. 1997).
117. Id. at § 3208-a(2).
118. Id. at § 3208-a(3).
119. Id. at § 3208-a(4).
1998]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
pate in a sport contrary to the team physician's medical judgment. 120
However, the Second Circuit, refusing to resolve conflicting testimony
by medical experts, held that the same athlete did not have a federal
right to participate under the Rehabilitation Act without medical clear-
ance from the team physician.121
The judicial/medical fact-finding model allows a court to substitute its
judgment on medical issues for that of the team physician, which may
thereby adversely affect the quality of sports medicine care rendered to
athletes. The law should not create an incentive for a team physician to
place greater weight on legal rather than medical considerations when
evaluating athletes' physical fitness.122 This model encourages athletes,
motivated by economic or psychological reasons, to shop for favorable
opinions in order to obtain medical clearance to play a sport and facili-
tates second-guessing of the team physician's medical judgment. The
team physician/athlete relationship is based on a trust relationship that
will be seriously compromised if a court interferes with the exercise of
medical judgment exercised to protect an amateur athlete's health and
safety.Y2 3
3. Athlete Informed Consent Model
The athlete informed consent model is based on a strong libertarian
philosophy that would enable a physically impaired athlete to voluntarily
assume the risk of a potentially serious injury, which is not medically
certain, or even likely, to occur. 24 This philosophy promotes individual
120. Kampmeier v. Harris, 411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1978). See also Pace v. Dryden Central Sch.
Dist., 574 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1991). See generally Milani, supra note 29; & Mitten, supra note 28 at
1026-28.
121. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2nd Cir. 1978).
122. In Penny v. Sands, Case No. H89-280 (D. Conn., filed May 3, 1989), an athlete al-
leged that a cardiologist was negligent for withholding medical clearance to play college bas-
ketball due to his potentially life-threatening heart condition. He claimed economic damages
of $1,000,000 because Central Connecticut State University relied on this physician's recom-
mendation to exclude Penny from its basketball program for two years, which allegedly
harmed his anticipated future professional basketball career. The university eventually al-
lowed Penny to resume playing intercollegiate after two other cardiologists medically cleared
him to do so. Penny voluntarily dismissed this case before the court decided the merits of his
claim. He subsequently collapsed and died suddenly while playing in a 1990 professional bas-
ketball game in England. See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive
Athletes: Allocating Legal Responsibility For Athletic Injuries, 55 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 129 (1993).
123. Mitten, supra note 122, at 138-42.
124. Some amateur athletes are willing to take potentially life-threatening risks to partici-
pate in competitive sports. See Mitten, supra note 28, at 993-94. A recent study reveals that
college athletes engage in significantly more high risk behaviors then their non-athletic peers.
Aurelia Nattiv, Lifestyles and Health Risks of Collegiate Student-Athletes, NCAA SPORTS Sci-
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autonomy over communality and is espoused in John Stuart Mill's semi-
nal work ON LIBERTY.'" In relevant part, Mill states:
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
[The] principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of fram-
ing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we
like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impedi-
ment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not
harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish,
perverse, or wrong.
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily,
or mental or spiritual. 26
When I initially considered this issue, I adopted a libertarian posi-
tion and argued that there is no legal justification under the Act for
excluding a physically impaired athlete from intercollegiate or interscho-
lastic athletics if competent physicians have conflicting participation rec-
ommendations based on an individualized examination of the athlete
and a differing evaluation of the medical risks. 27 I asserted that, when
there is no definite scientific answer or consensus among medical ex-
perts, and there are different credible conclusions regarding the medical
risks of participating, a physically impaired athlete (and parents or
guardian if he or she is a minor) has a legal right to choose to participate
in school-sponsored athletics. Arguably, the Act's "reasonable accom-
modation" requirement mandates that the team or athletic event spon-
sor allow the athlete to choose the physician(s) whose assessment of the
medical risks controls. Court-ordered athletic participation under the
Act should create an implied immunity absolving a school from tort lia-
ENCES EDUCATION NEWSLETTER, at 2 (Spring 1996). Other athletes, such as Olympic luge
racer Duncan Kennedy, who was born with a bleeding brain stem known as arteriovenous
malformation, choose not to participate in a sport even with medical clearance. Mike Dodd,
Kennedy Decides to End Luge Run, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 1997, at 12C; Bill Sullivan, One
Last Chance - Kennedy Battles Bleeding Brain Stem, Puts Luge Medal in Doubt, Hou.
CHRON., Dec. 14, 1997, at 5B.
125. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1986).
126. Id. at 16 & 19.
127. Mitten, supra note 28, at 1016-26.
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bility if an athlete suffers injury relating to or caused by one's physical
abnormality. 28
This model embodies the philosophy that the Act prohibits a school
or sponsor of an athletic event from substituting its decision for that of a
fully informed athlete who chooses to participate in athletics based on
credible medical clearance. The physically impaired athlete has a right to
exercise his or her individual autonomy and choose to accept an en-
hanced, but medically uncertain risk of injury, free of a school's pater-
nalistic concerns.
The primary weakness of the athlete informed consent model is its
de-emphasis of a school's legitimate interest in protecting a physically
impaired athlete's health and safety.129 Courts have recognized that the
relationship between an educational institution and its athletes is con-
sensual in nature.13 Also, Davis holds that a school may legally estab-
lish reasonable physical qualifications to ensure the safety standards that
must be satisfied in order to participate in its programs and activities. 3 '
Nevertheless, this model provides a physically impaired athlete who has
been medically disqualified by the team physician with a federal right to
participate in a sport if he or she is able to obtain medical clearance from
another physician.
Even if one accepts Mill's libertarian view that an individual should
not be prevented from engaging in activities that may endanger one's
health, this philosophy does not support a construction of the Act requir-
ing a school to involuntarily permit a medically disqualified athlete to
participate in its athletic program. Properly interpreted, Mill's philoso-
phy supports a physically impaired athlete's right to refuse medical
treatment and to individually engage in athletic activities that threaten
his or her health, but it does not justify requiring the sponsor of an ath-
letics event to involuntarily provide a playing field for endangering
one's personal health. For example, a long distance runner with a poten-
tially life-threatening cardiovascular abnormality that may be aggravated
by strenuous exercise cannot be forced to undergo a recommended med-
ical procedure or prevented from running on one's own. However, he or
she should not have a legal right to participate on the university's cross
128. Id. at 1023 & 1025-26.
129. Such a liberal individualistic view disregards the communitarian philosophy that we
are each other's keepers and have a responsibility to look out for the welfare of others.
AMITAi ETzIoNI, THE SPiRIT OF CoMMuNIry: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE CoNMMU-
NrrARIA.N AGENDA (1993).
130. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8:189
ENHANCED RISK OF HARM
country team even if physically able to do so, after being medically dis-
qualified by the team physician. Properly considered, Mill's libertarian
philosophy does not affirmatively support requiring the school to allow
him to participate even if other physicians provide medical clearance. A
team or sponsor of an amateur athletic event should not be legally re-
quired to provide the arena for an uncontrolled medical experiment that
may have tragic consequences. 32
4. Team Physician Medical Judgment Model
All things considered, the team physician medical judgment model
strikes the appropriate balance between an amateur athlete's interest in
athletic participation and the team or athletic event sponsor's interest in
protecting the health and safety of participants. Under this model, an
athlete receives an individualized evaluation of his or her physical condi-
tion and may be legally excluded only "based on reasoned and medically
sound judgments.' 33 All medically relevant factors relating to the per-
sonal health risks created by the athlete's physical impairment such as
the nature, duration, probability, and severity of harm, as well as
whether reasonable accommodations will effectively eliminate or safely
reduce the risk of injury are considered.
Exclusion is permissible only if the court finds the team physician has
a reasonable medical basis for determining that athletic competition cre-
ates a significant risk of substantial harm to a physically impaired ath-
lete. 35 A court is much better equipped to evaluate whether there is a
reasonable basis for medically disqualifying an impaired athlete than to
resolve, as a matter of fact, a medical issue when physicians have con-
flicting opinions. This model creates a presumption favoring the team
physician, but it does not establish an irrefutable presumption that the
team physician's medical judgment is correct or require a court to defer
to it. For example, there may be no reasoned medical basis for excluding
athletes with a missing or non-functioning paired organ from a contact
sport. In this situation an athlete has the same risk of injury in terms of
132. In recent years Boston Celtics basketball player Reggie Lewis and Loyola Mary-
mount University basketball player Hank Gathers, who both had known cardiovascular ab-
normalities, died while playing basketball. See Mitten, supra note 122, at 129-31.
133. Arline, 480 U.S. at 285.
134. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484-85.
135. Id. at 483. Accord Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993) ("Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation - i.e., 'good
grounds,' based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony per-
tain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.")
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the probability of personal harm to a paired organ as any other partici-
pant.1 36 Although the consequences of an injury to a single eye or kidney
may be more severe, protective gear or padding probably will effectively
reduce this risk. This is the same result that the Poole, Wright, and Grube
courts reached while using the athlete informed consent model. 137 Thus,
under the team physician model, athletes have a legal right to participate
under the Act if there is no valid medical basis for disqualifying them.138
The team physician medical judgment model best furthers the legiti-
mate goal of enhancing the quality of sports medicine care rendered to
athletes. Although one of the team physician's objectives is to avoid the
unnecessary restriction of athletic activity, his or her paramount legal
and ethical responsibility is to protect an athlete's health.139 Judicial rec-
ognition of the team physician's legal authority to medically disqualify a
physically impaired athlete, without fear of unnecessary second guessing,
creates a strong incentive to render high quality care to athletes.
The Knapp appellate court held that a team physician may rely on
consensus guidelines regarding the advisability of athletic participation
when an athlete has physical abnormalities. 40 Such guidelines are partic-
ularly helpful to a physician if the medical risks of playing a sport are
uncertain. 14 1 As the Knapp appellate court explained, "[S]uch guidelines
should not substitute for individualized assessment of an athlete's partic-
ular physical condition, [but] the consensus recommendations of several
physicians in a certain field do carry weight" in judicial determination of
136. Greenwood v. State Police Training Center, 606 A.2d 336, 343 (N.J. 1992) (finding
that "risk of damage to Greenwood's left eye is as insubstantial as it is to any other trainee.")
137. See generally notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
138. The following illustration presents an interesting case under this model. After per-
mitting Danee Mastagni to participate in the university's intercollegiate swimming program
for almost three years, Texas A&M University's team physician medically disqualified her
after she passed out in the pool during a race. She has Parkinson-White Syndrome, which is
an abnormal electrical conduction pathway in her heart. The American Heart Association
says that persons with this syndrome can lead normal lives with no restrictions on their activi-
ties, and university medical personnel previously accepted medical clearance recommenda-
tions from her treating specialists. Although she may experience fainting spells during
strenuous workouts, her condition is not life-threatening. Tom Turbiville, Diver Down, AGs
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 8, 1997, at 24. These facts raise the issue of whether there is a reasonable
medical basis for excluding her from the University's swimming team.
139. Mitten, supra note 122, at 138-42.
140. 101 F.3d at 485. In Arline, the Supreme Court held that "courts normally should
defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials" in deciding claims under
the Rehabilitation Act, but did not consider whether the medical judgments of private physi-
cians should be given deferential weight. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
141. Mitten, supra note 122, at 150-52.
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whether there is a reasonable medical basis for disqualifying a physically
impaired athlete.'4
Although use of the team physician medical judgment model may
preclude an athlete from engaging in competitive athletics at a particular
school, it would not necessarily prevent an athlete from playing else-
where. As the Knapp appellate court observed: "[On] the same facts,
another team physician... might reasonably decide that Knapp met the
physical qualifications for playing on an intercollegiate basketball
team."' 43 After losing his Rehabilitation Act suit against Northwestern
University, Nick Knapp transferred to Northeastern Illinois University
and received medical clearance to play college basketball.'"
The team physician medical judgment model places legitimate com-
munitarian health and safety concerns above an athlete's libertarian per-
sonal autonomy interests. If all concerned parties - the athlete, team
physician, and school - cannot agree on the acceptability of assuming an
enhanced but medically uncertain risk on the playing field, it is better to
err on the side of caution.' 45
IV. PHYSICALLY IMPAIRED PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES'
POTENTIAL CLAIMS
A disability discrimination claim brought by a professional athlete
most likely would have to be asserted under the ADA because entities
and organizations sponsoring professional sports generally do not re-
ceive federal funding.14 6 Depending upon the particular sport, the
142. 101 F.3d at 485. Using guidelines as a means of categorically excluding all athletes
with certain physical abnormalities, rather than providing an individualized medical evalua-
tion, would violate the Act. See, e.g., Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ohio
1993). A blanket exclusion of all persons with a particular physical abnormality without an
individualized examination of his or her medical condition also violates the ADA. Anderson v
Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992).
143. 101 F.3d at 485.
144. In November, 1997, his heart defibrillator misread his heart rhythm and activated
itself while Knapp was warming up before basketball practice. After reprogramming this de-
vice, his cardiologists cleared him to resume playing college basketball. Bill Liesse, Knapp
Step Away From Action, PEORIA STAR J., 1997 WL 7687563, Dec. 28, 1997; Gene Wojciechow-
ski, Shocker Is This Player Still Wants the Ball, C-. TRm., 1997 WL 3618045, Dec. 6, 1997.
145. Hill, 865 P.2d at 633 (scientific controversy regarding safety risks in connection with
athletics participation dictates caution and prudence).
146. Although currently there are no ADA cases considering whether a physically im-
paired professional athlete may be excluded because of a risk of harm to one's self, a profes-
sional hockey player with sight in only one eye relied upon the New York Human Rights Law
to successfully challenge a league bylaw that categorically rendered him medically ineligible to
play for any league team Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y.
1977).
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ADA's provisions relating to employers, 47 public entities,'148 or places of
public accommodation, 49 may apply. For example, a federal magistrate
recently held that the Professional Golfers Association Tour is subject to
the ADA in a suit brought by a physically impaired golfer seeking to ride
in a golf cart in order to play professional golf. 150 Like similar claims
brought by amateur athletes under the Rehabilitation Act, the key issues
under the ADA are whether a professional athlete is "disabled" and
whether exclusion solely because of an enhanced risk of physical harm to
one's self is legally valid.
A. Exclusion from Professional Athletics as Substantially Limiting a
Major Life Activity
To be protected by the ADA, a professional athlete must have a "dis-
ability," which requires proof that his or her physical impairment sub-
stantially limits a major life activity, has a record of such an impairment,
or is regarded as having such an impairment.' 5' The ADA's regulations
broadly define "physical impairment," which encompasses a permanent
condition such as a missing or non-functioning paired organ (e.g., an eye
or kidney), spinal stenosis, or a cardiovascular abnormality.' 2 Although
these regulations expressly list "working" as a major life activity,' 53
courts have held that the exclusion of a physically impaired person from
only a particular job for a single employer or a narrow range of jobs does
not substantially limit one's ability to work if he or she is eligible for
other employment. For example, an individual with a physical abnormal-
ity which disqualifies him or her from a particular occupation such as a
policeman,154 or fireman, 55 but does not otherwise substantially limit
another major life activity, is not "disabled" under the ADA.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (hereinafter
"EEOC") interpretive guidelines, which accompany the ADA's regula-
tions governing employment, provide that an individual is not substan-
tially limited in working if he or she "is unable to perform a specialized
job or profession requiring extraordinary skill, prowess or talent."' 56 An
147. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (1995).
148. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131 & 12132 (1995).
149. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(L) (1995).
150. Martin v PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998).
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12.102(2) (1995).
152. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (h)(i) (1997).
153. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (I) (1997).
154. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989).
155. Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 977 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992).
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, Appendix § 1630.20) (1997).
[Vol. 8:189
ENHANCED RISK OF HARM
illustrative example is "a professional baseball pitcher who develops a
bad elbow and can no longer throw a baseball."'1 57 The baseball player's
physical impairment does not substantially limit his ability to engage in
most other employment or other major life activities such as "caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, [or] learning."'15 This illustration suggests that a physically
impaired professional athlete is not "disabled" unless he or she proves
that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity other than
merely working as a professional athlete.
Strict application of the "substantially limits a major life activity"
requirement can lead to the result that certain physically impaired pro-
fessional athletes are covered by the ADA, whereas, others are not. For
example, a blind or deaf athlete is "disabled" because either impairment
substantially limits, respectively, the major life activity of either seeing
or hearing. On the other hand, an athlete with spinal stenosis or a car-
diovascular abnormality may not be able to prove that either medical
condition substantially limits a major life activity.'59 Yet the blind or deaf
athletes are legally entitled to an individualized evaluation of their re-
spective medical conditions, whereas, the other athletes are not. This is
despite the fact that all of these athletes have the unique skills needed to
play professional sports in spite of their physical impairment and are eli-
gible for other non-athletic employment. There is no principled justifica-
tion for protecting some physically impaired professional athletes under
the ADA, but not others.
Even if a professional athlete's physical impairment does not actu-
ally substantially limit a major life activity, he or she should be able to
show he or she is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activ-
ity of working, which is an alternative means of satisfying the ADA's
definition of "disability."' 60 In construing the same statutory language
under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court observed that
"[C]ongress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limi-
tations that flow from actual impairment."'' Therefore, the "disability"
requirement is satisfied when a person is regarded as substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity, according to the Court, because "[s]uch an
157. Id.
158. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (i) (1997).
159. Courts have held that college athletes with either of these conditions are not "dis-
abled" under the Rehabilitation Act. See supra notes 73-74 and 79-82 and accompanying text.
160. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (1995).
161. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
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impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabili-
ties, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to
work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the
impairment."'162
As a practical matter, a professional athlete is likely to assert an
ADA claim only if the governing body for a professional sport, or all of
the teams in a professional league, refuse to provide him or her with an
opportunity to participate in a sport on the ground that his or her physi-
cal impairment is perceived as creating an undue risk of harm to him!
herself. If a person is totally excluded from employment as a profes-
sional athlete, solely because of a fear that his or her physical impair-
ment exposes him or her to an enhanced risk of personal injury, this
effectively and substantially limits his or her ability to work because of
all potential employers' negative reactions. Professional athletes train
for many years to develop the specialized and unique skills necessary to
earn their living. 163 These long years of training and commitment consti-
tute a major life activity for a professional athlete,"6 and exclusion from
a professional sport because of a perceived risk of harm to one's self
substantially limits this major life activity.
The ADA's central purpose is to ensure that discrimination against a
physically impaired person is medically justified based on an individual-
ized evaluation of one's condition, rather than on an unfounded general-
ization or stereotype about the potential effects of a physical
impairment.165 As a matter of policy, it is appropriate to treat all physi-
cally impaired professional athletes the same in determining whether
they are protected by the ADA. Each of them should have "the opportu-
nity to have [his or her] condition evaluated in light of medical evi-
dence,"' 6 6 and the federal right to participate in one's chosen profession,
namely professional athletes, unless exclusion therefrom is medically
justified.
162. Id. at 283.
163. Enjoining a professional hockey league from preventing a one-eyed player from par-
ticipating, one court observed: "The denial to plaintiff of an opportunity to play professional
hockey in the AHL vill result in the possibility of irreparable harm to plaintiff's professional
hockey career. A young athlete's skills diminish and sometimes are irretrievably lost unless he
is given an opportunity to practice and refine such skills at a certain level of proficiency."
Neeld, 439 F. Supp. at 461.
164. One court has held that "intercollegiate athletics can be a major life activity" for a
college athlete. Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1393. Accordingly, a professional sport is a major life
activity for a professional athlete.
165. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 342.
166. Arline, 480 U.S. at 286.
[Vol. 8:189
ENHANCED RISK OF HARM
B. "Otherwise Qualified" to Participate in Professional Athletics
The ADA expressly states that a "significant risk to the health and
safety of others"' 67 is a legitimate basis for excluding a disabled person
from employment, but does not state whether a risk of harm to one's self
justifies discrimination against a physically impaired employee. How-
ever, the EEOC's employment regulations interpreting the ADA pro-
vide that "a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of
the individual or others" justifies exclusion from employment.' 68 These
regulations adopt the Supreme Court's Arline standard under the Reha-
bilitation Act, which requires an individualized medical assessment of a
physically impaired person's condition in making this determination. 69
Courts are divided as to whether risk of harm to one's self is a legally
valid basis for exclusion from employment or other activity under the
ADA. 7 ° In Devlin v. Arizona Youth Soccer Association,'7 ' a federal dis-
trict court refused to strike a sports organization's affirmative defense
that its exclusion of a youth soccer player is justified, because his partici-
pation "will pose a substantial risk of harm to him." The court allowed
the soccer league to assert this defense and concluded, without elabora-
tion, that there are unresolved issues of law and fact regarding this issue.
However, in Kohnke v Delta Airlines, Inc.,72 another federal district
court ruled that "potential harm to a disabled person himself" is not a
permissible justification for employment discrimination under the ADA.
The court held that the EEOC regulation, recognizing this defense, is
contrary to the ADA's express language and its legislative history.
A professional sports team or event sponsor has a legitimate interest
in protecting the health and safety of all participating athletes. Absent
very clear evidence that this furthers congressional intent, the ADA
should not be construed to completely disregard this valid interest by
refusing to recognize a defense based on a significant risk of substantial
167. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(3) (1995).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1997) (emphasis added).
169. Id. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
170. Legal scholars also disagree whether risk of harm to one's self should legally justify
exclusion of a physically impaired athlete from a sport under the ADA. Professor Adam Mi-
lani asserts that judicial recognition of a risk of harm to one's self defense is inconsistent with
Congress' intended objectives in enacting the ADA. Milani, supra note 29. On the other
hand, Professor Cathy Jones argues that exclusion of a physically impaired athlete should be
legally permitted if necessary to prevent exposure to "a substantial risk of irreversible serious
bodily injury or death to the athlete.., which cannot be substantially prevented through
'reasonable accommodation."' Jones, supra note 103, at 206 & 207.
171. 1996 WL 118445, at 4 (D. Ariz. 1996).
172. 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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personal injury to a professional athlete. 73 The ADA should not be ju-
dicially construed to provide an absolute right for a professional athlete
to participate in a sport, even if he or she is unable to obtain medical
clearance from any competent physician, including the one(s) of his or
her choosing.
Unlike an amateur athlete, however, a professional athlete should
not be bound by the team physician's medical judgment, regarding
whether the athlete's physical impairment creates exposure to a signifi-
cant risk of substantial personal harm. A professional athlete has a
greater interest in pursuing his or her livelihood, with its potential multi-
million dollar earning potential, than an amateur athlete does in partici-
pating in sports as part of the educational process or for other personal
objectives. 174 Even though sponsors of amateur and professional sports
both have a legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of par-
ticipants, a professional athlete's participation interests are entitled to
more weight than those of an amateur athlete. Because exclusion from a
professional sport has some significant adverse consequences to an ath-
lete, he or she should be permitted to obtain second opinions regarding
the medical risks of participation with his or her impairment. 75
I propose adopting the athlete informed consent model for profes-
sional athletes, which would enable a professional athlete to choose to
participate, despite medical disqualification by the team physician, if
other competent medical authority clears him or her to play. Under this
model, a physically impaired professional athlete has a legal right to
choose to participate in a sport only if there is respected medical author-
ity clearing him or her to do so. A professional athlete would not be
conclusively bound by the team physician's recommendation that he or
she be medically disqualified, but rather may select the physician(s)
whose determination of the medical risks of playing a sport with his or
her physical impairment would be controlling. For example, although
they were precluded from playing intercollegiate sports under the team
physician medical judgment model, the ADA would provide Nicholas
173. For a discussion of my arguments against construing the Rehabilitation Act in a simi-
lar manner, see supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
174. A physically impaired amateur athlete with the requisite ability and skills to play a
professional sport may have a legal right to choose to participate at the professional level of
competition. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
175. In this regard, collective bargaining agreements governing the relationship between a
league of professional teams and the players' union already may provide a player with the
right to obtain a second medical evaluation of an employment-related injury or illness. See,
e.g., Jeffrey S. Moorad, Negotiating for the Professional Baseball Player, 1 LAw OF PROFES-
SIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 5-82, Chap. 5 (G.A. Uberstine, ed. 1997).
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Knapp and Alani Pahulu with an opportunity to participate in profes-
sional sports, under the athlete informed consent model, because
respected medical authority cleared them to participate.176
Under my proposed athlete informed consent model, a court's role
would be to ensure that there is a reasonable medical basis for clearing a
physically impaired professional athlete to participate in a sport. The
court should not resolve conflicting testimony by medical experts as a
matter of fact, but should limit its judicial inquiry to whether medical
clearance of a professional athlete is "individualized, reasonably made,
and based upon competent evidence as a matter of law."'17 7 If so, a pro-
fessional athlete is permitted to participate if he or she chooses to as-
sume the risk of future personal injury resulting from his or her physical
impairment while playing the sport. The team or sponsoring entity
should be immunized from tort liability for allowing a physically im-
paired professional athlete to choose to participate under these
circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Determining whether a physically impaired athlete has a legal right
under the Rehabilitation Act or ADA, to participate in a sport or ath-
letic event, despite an enhanced risk of personal harm requires consider-
ation of both the athlete's libertarian autonomy interest in participating
and the athletic event sponsor's communitarian interest in protecting the
athlete from an unreasonable risk of injury. Each side's interests are le-
gitimate, but neither side's rights are absolute. I believe that the team
physician medical judgment model best balances these respective inter-
ests in the context of amateur athletics whereas, the athlete informed
consent model most appropriately balances these interests in the context
of professional athletics, because professional athletes have a more sub-
stantial interest in participating in sports than do amateur athletes.
176. This model allows a professional athlete to participate despite medical disqualifica-
tion by the team physician or athletic event sponsor's medical personnel if current consensus
guidelines indicate playing a sport with a particular physical abnormality is medically safe.
177. This standard of review is the same as that used by the Knapp appellate court in
applying the team physician medical judgment model. 101 F.3d at 485.
178. Mitten, supra note 28 at 1023-24; Jones, supra note 103 at 209-210.
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